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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SHERYJi ["„ hEVEREAUX, . ) 
Petitioner/Appellant , 
TODD DEVEREAUX, 
Respondent/Appellee,. 
) Case No. 20050709 -CA 
. Di stri ct Ct. No. 020400494 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction ui i his appeal 
pursuant to U . C ./A . /'8 -Ad-2 (li) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD ui: KEVIEW 
Did the District Court violate, its jurisdiction by 
considering the issues of past due ciiibl ;support , payment of 
medical Di 1. I :", an award of attorney's fees, and by ordering a 20 
minute pick-up rule for purposes of visitation? 
The standard oi review is ' abuts ^  u| iha a ftJon" Chi Ids v. 
Childs, 90'/ lonJ ail i ut ati Ct . App. 1998) . 
Was the evidence sufficient to support the Court Orders 
dated July 19, 2005 and September 26, 2005? 
The standard of review is "clearly erroneous". Kessimakis 
v. Kessimakis, 977 P2nd 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) . 
Was it an error in law for the Court not to adopt the 
argument of counsel for Appellant? 
The standard of review is "abuse of discretion". Childs v. 
ChiIds, supra. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUES AND RULES 
Appellee submits that the following statues and rules are 
determinative: 
(1) D.CA. 30-3-5 (3) - the court has 
continuing jurisdiction to make 
subsequent changes or new orders for 
the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and 
dental care, and for distribution of 
the property and obligation for debts 
as is reasonable and necessary. 
(2) Rule 52 (a) U.R.C.P. - ... findings of 
fact, whether based on oral or 
2 
documentary evidence, shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge 
the credibility of the witnesses ... it 
will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated 
orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of evidence or 
appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In this case, the trial court considered competing claims 
of non-compliance by the parties at an Order to Show Cause 
hearing on April 13, 2005. 
Appellee (hereinafter referred to as uhusband") raised the 
issues of past due child support, payment of medical bills, an 
award of attorney's fees, and visitation issues. 
Appellant (hereinafter referred to as uwife"), addressed 
the same issues and disputed the allegations of the "husband". 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
A Decree of Divorce was entered April 17, 1997. [Record on 
3 
appeal 234] . 
An Amended Decree was entered on November 29, 1999. [R. 
507] . 
An Order was entered on February 25, 2002, requiring "wife" 
to pay child support of $240 per month retro-active to Kfovember 
28, 1999. [R. 639] . 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on 
June 10, 2004 which addressed a variety of issues. 
An Order and Judgment were entered on June 10, 2004. [R. 
1072] . 
A hearing on Order to Show Cause was held on April 13, 2005 
and the trial court issued its written Ruling on May 2, 2005. 
[R. 1200] . 
An Order was entered on July 21, 2005, which reflected the 
Trial Court's ruling of May 2, 2005. [R. 1227]. 
"Wife" filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, which was 
denied by the Trial Court Order of August 4, 2005. [R. 1231] . 
A Supplemental Order was issued on September 22, 2 0 05, 
which awarded attorney's fees to "husband". [R. 1266]. 
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C. DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The Trial Court considered the evidence submitted, the 
proffer of counsel, the argument of counsel, and issued its 
written ruling (Appendix "A") that: 
1. "Wife" was obligated to pay child 
support, had not paid, and owed $4,4 84 
to "husband". 
2. "Husband" had paid medical bills, 
"wife" had not paid her one-half, and 
owed $4,772 to "husband". 
3. Visitation was problematic and travel 
on freeways and the distance between 
the parties required the implementation 
of a 20 minute pick-up rule. 
4. "Husband" prevailed on all issues, 
"wife" prevailed on some, "wife" had 
previously been awarded $11,506 in 
attorney's fees, and "husband' was 
entitled to a portion of his fees 
(later determined to be $1,500) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered April 16, 1997, 
wherein "wife" was given custody of the minor children. [R. 
238] . 
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2. An Amended Decree was entered on November 29, 19 99, 
wherein "husband" was awarded custody of the minor children and 
"wife" was ordered to pay child support. [R. 507] . 
3. An Order was entered February 25, 2 002, which set the 
amount of child support to be paid by "wife" at $240 per month, 
beginning November 28, 1999. |R. 633] . 
4. On June 10, 2004, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and an Order and Judgment were entered. [R. 1068, 1072]. 
5. Said Order and Judgment addressed child support owed 
by "wife" for years 2001 through 2003, but did not address the 
amount she owed for 1999, 2000, and 2004. [R. 1065, para. 10] . 
6. "Wife" did not claim to have paid child support, nor 
did she provide evidence of payment. [R. 1199] . 
7. "Husband" claimed no payment by "wife" for 1999, 2000, 
2004, and 2005, for a total delinquency of $4,484. [R. 1302, p. 
3-4] . 
8. The procedure for payment of medical bills was set 
forth at the hearing of March 1, 2004 and incorporated in the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [R. 1068, para. 9]. 
9. "Husband" claimed that he had paid medical bills, 
followed the required procedure, and that "wife" refused to pay. 
[R. 1302, p. 5 - 10] . 
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10. "Wife" claimed that medical bill procedure should be 
triggered by the time when the bill was incurred, not the time 
when payment was made . [R. 1302, p. 12 - 16] . 
11. The Trial Court found that uhusband" followed the 
correct procedure, that "wife" owed one-half of the medical 
bills, had not paid the same, and that "wife" therefore owed 
"husband" $4,772 for medical bills. [R. 1134 - 1172 and 1198 -
1199] . 
12. "Husband" claimed pick-up and drop-off for visitation 
purposes were erratic. [R. 1302, p. 10]. 
13. "Wife" claimed problems with visitation. [R. 13 02, 
p.20] . 
14. The Trial Court found that a 20 minute pick-up rule 
was reasonable under the facts claimed by the parties. [R. 1197 
- 1198] . 
15. "Husband" claimed that he should be awarded attorney's 
fees [R. 1302, p. 10] and submitted an Attorney's Fee Affidavit 
[R. 1261] . 
16. "Wife" had previously been awarded attorney's fees in 
the sum of $11,506, but disputed "husband's" claim of attorney's 
fees. [R. 1070, R. 1302, p. 25- 26]. 
17. The Trial Court found that "husband" prevailed on all 
7 
his issues, that "wife" prevailed on some issues, that past 
attorney's fees had been awarded "wife" ($11,506) and that 
"husband" was entitled to a portion of his fees ($1,500). [R. 
1196, R. 1266]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court acted within its jurisdiction under U.C.A. 
30-3-5 (3) when it considered the issues of past due child 
support, payment of medical bills, an award of attorney's fees 
and by ordering a 20 minute pick-up rule at the hearing of April 
13, 2005. 
The evidence submitted and the findings contained in the 
written ruling of the Trial Court, dated May 2, 2005, were, 
under Rule 52 (a) U.R.C.P. , sufficient to support the Orders of 
July 20, 2005, and September 26, 2005. 
The Trial Court gave appropriate consideration to the 
statements and arguments of counsel and no special weight should 
be given to either attorney by virtue of "natural law" . 
8 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court acted within its jurisdiction under 
U.C.A. 30-3-5(3) when it considered the issues of past 
due child support, payment of medical bills, an award 
of attorney's fees, and by ordering a 20 minute pick-
up rule at the hearing of April 13, 2 005. 
The District Court did not violate its jurisdiction by 
considering the issues of past due child support, payment of 
medical bills, an award of attorney's fees, and by ordering a 20 
minute pick-up rule for purposes of visitation. 
Sec. 30-3-5(3) U.C.A. specifically grants the trial court 
continuing jurisdiction to consider: 
1. Child support; 
2. Debts; 
3. Visitation; and 
4. Attorney's fees. 
This Court has previously held that: 
...trial courts may exercise broad 
discretion in divorce matters so long as the 
decision is within the confines of legal 
9 
precedence. Childs v. Childs, supra . 
In the instant case, the continuing jurisdiction of the 
trial court was invoked by both parties at the Order to Show 
Cause hearing of April 13, 2005. The court considered the 
evidence and argument of counsel and made an appropriate ruling 
which was then reflected in the Order of July 20, 2005. 
(Appendix UB"). 
The trial court weighed the evidence and argument of 
counsel, reviewed the file, and issued a written ruling setting 
forth findings and an appropriate order on the relevant issues. 
These actions and the issues addressed are within the Court's 
continuing jurisdiction as set forth in Sec. 30-3-5(3) U.C.A. 
ARGUMENT 
II. The evidence submitted and the findings contained in 
the written ruling of the Trial Court, dated May 2, 
2005, were, under Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P., sufficient to 
support the Orders of July 20, 2005, and September 26, 
2005. 
The evidence was sufficient to support the Orders of July 
10 
19, 2005 and September 26, 2005 (Appendix WB" and UC") and 
uwife" failed to adequately marshal evidence to support the 
trial court's findings. 
Rule 52(a) U.R.C.P. provides in part as follows: 
Findings of fact are sufficient if they 
"appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision". 
The trial court issued its written ruling on May 2, 2 005 
and set forth its findings and conclusions. 
In the recent case of Kessimakis, supra, the court stated 
as follows: 
The trial court is uniquely situated to 
judge matters bearing on the weight and 
credibility that should be given to 
evidence, and we will not overturn the 
court's ruling unless it is clearly 
erroneous. Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P2nd 147 
(Utah 1987) . 
"Wife" has not adequately marshaled evidence in support of 
the court's findings. Even if she had, it is respectfully urged 
that there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the 
trial court's decision. 
Furthermore, "husband" respectfully suggests that the 
decision of the trial court does not exceed limits of 
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reasonability and is consistent with the evidence received by 
the court. 
Section 30-3-3 U.C.A. provides that ua trial court may 
award attorney's fees and costs in divorce proceedings". 
In the instant case, "wife" was previously awarded over 
$11,000 in attorney's fees. "Husband" substantially prevailed 
in this case and was awarded $1,500 in attorney's fees. It 
would be equitable for this court to sustain the award of 
attorney's fees of the trial court and award additional fees for 
the appeal. 
"Wife" has failed to give complete citations, failed to 
identify Standards of Review, failed to identify specific 
controlling statutes or rules, failed to argue point I of her 
argument, failed to identify the bias or prejudice of the trial 
court, failed to state her argument regarding the 2 0 minute 
pick-up rule, failed to provide page 28 of the brief, and failed 
to argue the issue of attorney's fees. 
It is respectfully requested that "husband" be awarded his 
attorney's fees for this appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
III. The Trial Court gave appropriate consideration to 
the statements and arguments of counsel and no 
special weight should be given to either attorney 
by virtue of "natural law". 
uWife" complains that her attorney's statements should be 
granted "deontological" weight. The word deontological appears 
to mean "the philosophy of ethics, rights, and duties as a 
matter of natural law". It appears that her argument is that 
her attorney's statements and arguments should be adopted over 
those of her husband's attorney. 
It seems clear however, that the duty of the trial court is 
to sort out credible evidence and argument of counsel and 
determine the facts as they appear proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when it 
considered the issues of past due child support, payment of 
medical bills, an award of attorney's fees, and by ordering a 20 
13 
minute pick-up rule at the hearing of April 13, 2 005. 
The evidence submitted in the findings contained in the 
written ruling of the trial court, dated May 2, 2 0 05, was 
sufficient to support the orders of July 20, 2005 and September 
26, 2005. 
The trial court gave appropriate consideration to the 
statements and argument of counsel, and no special weight should 
be given to either attorney by virtue of "natural law" . 
It is respectfully urged that the trial court's decision 
should be affirmed and fees awarded to the "husband". 
DATED this 2~C day of July, 2 0 06. 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing on this 26th day of July, 2006, by 
first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Sheryl Devereaux 
1405 West 9000 South, #187 
West Jordan, Utah 84088-9217 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHERYLP DEVEREAUX, 
Petitioner, 
vs 
TODD S DEVEREAUX, 
Respondent 
CASE NUMBER 964401781 
DATED MAY 2, 2005 
RULING 
ANTHONY W SCHOFTELD, JUDGE 
Order to show cause in this case was held April 13, 2005 The parties raised 
competing issues of non-compliance by the other with prior orders of the court I now 
issue this ruling resolving all of the issues raised at the hearing 
Child support. 
Ms Devereaux is obligated to pay child support Mr Devereaux alleges she has 
not done so for one month m 1999, twelve months m 2000, part of 2004 and part of 2005 
Ms Devereaux asserts that the alleged failuie to pay in 1999 and 2000 was addressed in 
the court's ruling of April 14, 2004 She is wrong 
hi the April 14, 2004, ruling the court addressed the failure of Mi Deveieaux to 
pay alimony and allowed certain offsets for child support aneaiages owed by Ms 
1 
Deveieaux The yeais at issue, however, did not include 1999 01 2000 and no offsets 
weie allowed for unpaid child support from 1999 or 2000 Thus, the issue of the alleged 
failuie of Ms Deveieaux to pay child support was not addiessed 
Ms Devereaux's only real defense to Mr Deveieaux's charge she is m arrears on 
child support was her res judicata defense She did not claim that she had paid the 
support at issue Nor did she provide any proof of payment I find that Ms Devereaux 
did not pay, and thus owes child support, as follows 
1999 $ 240 
2000 $2,880 
2004 $1,103 
2005 $ 261 
Total $4,484 
Mr Devereaux is entitled to judgment in this amount 
Medical bills. 
In the Amended Decree (arising out of the ruling of April 14, 2004), with respect 
to any future payments for medical expenses for the children, the court ordered that the 
paient making a medical payment foi the children must "provide written verification of 
the cost and payment of a medical expense to the other parent withm 30 days of 
payment " Mr Devereaux asserts he has done so on four separate occasions and that Ms 
Devereaux has not followed the next part of the Decree, which compels the "parent 
receiving the notification of the bill" to then make "prompt (immediate) payment of half 
of the out of pocket portion of such a bill " 
Mr Devereaux is conect 
Ms Devereaux's primary defense to this claim is that the lion's share of these 
2 
medical expenses is for orthodontia and dental work for die children that was committed 
to and the service rendered before the March 1,2004, cutoff that Judge Tayloi oidered 
In fact, however, the ordei focuses on the time of payment, not the time the bill was 
incurred As to each of die bills at issue here, Mr Devereaux paid the bill in full aftei 
March 1, 2004, and then timely submitted to Ms Devereaux a copy of the bill together 
with a copy of his check or proof of credit card payment of the account Ms Devereaux 
has not then paid her one-halfback to Mr Deveieaux 
Mr Devereaux paid medical bills for the children as to which Ms Devereaux's 
one-half share is the following 
Bills mailed July 6, 2004 $2,181 
Bills mailed August 17,2004 $ 355 
Bills mailed November 7, 2004 $2,149 
Bills mailed January 19,2005 $ 87 
Total $4,772 
Mr Devereaux is entitled to judgment for these unreimbursed medical payments 
which he made on behalf of the children 
Alimony. 
Mr Devereaux concedes that he underpaid alimony for four months in 2004 m the 
sum of $527 50 per month, or a total of $2,110 Ms Devereaux is entitled to judgment m 
that amount 
Pick up and drop off requirements. 
The parties have not been able to agree on much One sticking point is that Mi 
Devereaux asserts that Ms Devereaux is consistently late m pick up and drop off for 
visitation He asks that I implement the 15-minute rule She objects, citing sometimes 
3 
heavy traffic on the freeway, something that from personal experience I know is real 
Children, as well as parents, need consistency and regularity in then plans and 
lives It is unfair to all if pick up and drop off for visitation are consistently tardy Given 
the natuie of the travel on the freeways and the distance the parties live apart, they should 
implement a 20-minute rule All pick up and drop off must occur m the 20 minutes 
before or 20 minutes after the scheduled time A parent and the children may assume that 
if a parent if more than 20 minutes late to pick up for visitation, the visitation is not going 
to occur and may move forward with other plans If a parent is consistently late in drop 
off after visitation, the court may considei modification to the visitation schedule for the 
non-complying parent 
Visitation. 
Visitation is a conundrum Ms Devereaux asserts that after she makes plans for 
summertime visitation, for example, mterfenng activities arise, such as church camps and 
conferences for the children 
Ms Devereau* is entitled to the summertime parent time provided by statute and 
m the decree Mr Devereaux is directed to not schedule other activities for the children 
during the times that Ms Devereaux schedules If a thud party, such as the children's 
youth group at church, schedules such activities, Mr Devereraux must promptly notify 
Ms Devereaux of the scheduled activity and attempt m utmost good faith to find an 
acceptable compromise that allows the children both to go forward with visitation and to 
attend the scheduled third-party activities (I note that it is uncommon for such activities 
to be scheduled late m the game Usually, since the youth leaders need to be able to 
4 
schedule with their families and employers also, these schedules are fixed early m the 
calendar year, if not before, and the parties should be able to accommodate the summer 
parent time wishes of each other) If, m order to arrange for the children's participation in 
church or other third-party activities, some give must occur, Mr. Devereaux is directed to 
be the first to give to find accommodation. 
Attorney's fees. 
Mr. Devereaux prevailed on all of the issues which he raised. Ms. Devereaux 
prevailed on some of the issues which she raised. Bearing in mind the past fees awarded 
in this case, I conclude that Mr Devereaux is entitled to an award of a portion of his 
attorney's fees. His counsel is directed promptly to file an attorney's fee affidavit and the 
court will fix the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded to him. 
Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Devereaux's counsel 
is directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated this ^Z_ day of May, 2005. 
BY THE COURT: - ' -: ~ ' ^ 
ANTHONY tW. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this ^L day of May, 2005: 
John Walsh 
2319 Foothill Drive, Suite 270 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Brian C. Harrison 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
LOW WOFFINDEN 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
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EXHIBIT "B 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P.C. 
Brian C. Harrison (#1388) 
Attorney for Respondent 
3651 North 100 East, Suite 300 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 375-7700 
Facsimile: (801) 852-3175 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERYL DEVERAUX, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
-vs- ] 
TODD DEVERAUX, ] 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
) Civil No- 964401781 
) JUDGE TAYLOR 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 13 th 
day of April, 2 005, Petitioner being present and represented by her 
attorney, John Walsh, and Respondent being present and represented 
by his attorney, Brian C. Harrison. The parties having raised 
competing issues of non-compliance by the other with prior orders 
of the court, and the court being fully advised in the premises; 
< : ; • " " - - ^ 0 
W 
""'ct n 
'sh 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Petitioner is obligated to pay child support. Respondent 
alleges Petitioner has not done so for one month in 1999, twelve 
months in 2000, part of 2004 and part of 2005. Petitioner asserts 
that the alleged failure to pay in 1999 and 2000 was addressed in 
the Court's ruling of April 14, 2 004. Petitioner is wrong. 
2. In the April 14, 2004, ruling the Court addressed the 
failure of Respondent to pay alimony and allowed certain offsets 
for child support arrearages owed by Petitioner. The years at 
issue, did not include 1999 or 2 00 0 and no offsets were allowed for 
unpaid child support from 1999 or 2000. The issue of the alleged 
failure of Petitioner to pay child support was not addressed. 
3. Petitioner's only real defense to Respondent's charge she 
is in arrears on child support was her res judicata, defense. She 
did not claim that she had paid the support at issue. Nor did she 
provide any proof of payment. The Court finds that Petitioner did 
not pay, and thus owes child support as follows: 
a. 1999 $ 240 
b. 2000 $2,800 
c. 2004 $1,103 
d. 2005 $ 261 
Total: $4,484 
Respondent is granted judgment in this amount. 
4. In the Amended Decree of the ruling of April 14, 20 04, 
with respect to any future payments for medical expenses for the 
children, the Court ordered that the parent making a medical 
payment for the children must "provide written verification of the 
cost and payment of a medical expense to the other parent within 3 0 
days of payment.'1. Respondent asserts he has done so on four 
separate occasions and that Petitioner has not followed the next 
part of the Decree, which compels the "parent receiving the 
notification of the bill" to then make "prompt (immediate payment 
of half of the out of pocket portion of such a bill." 
5. Respondent is correct. Petitioner's primary defense to 
this claim is that the lion's share of these medical expenses is 
for orthodontia and dental work for the children that was committed 
to and the service rendered before March 1, 2 0 04, cutoff that Judge 
Taylor ordered. In fact, the order focuses on the time of the 
payment, not the time the bill was incurred. As to each of the 
bills at issue here, Respondent paid the bill in full after March 
3 
1, 2004, and then timely submitted to Petitioner a copy of the bill 
together with a copy of his check or proof of credit card payment 
of the account. Petitioner has not then paid her one-half back to 
Respondent. 
6. Respondent paid medical bills for the children as to 
which Petitioner's one-half share is the following: 
a. Bills mailed July 6, 2004 $2,181 
b. Bills mailed August 17, 2004 $ 355 
c. Bills mailed November 7, 2004 $2,149 
d. Bills mailed January 19, 2005 $ 87 
Total: $4,772 
Respondent is granted judgment for these unreimbursed medical 
payments which he made on behalf of the children. 
7. Respondent concedes that he underpaid alimony for four 
months in 2004 in the sum of $527.50 per month, or a total of 
$2,110. Petitioner is granted to judgment in that amount. 
8. The parties have not been able to agree on much. One 
sticking point is that Respondent asserts that Petitioner is 
consistently late in pick up and drop off for visitation. 
Respondent asks that the 15-minute rule be implemented. Petitioner 
objects, citing sometimes heavy traffic on the freeway. 
Children, as well as parents, need consistency and regularity 
in their plans and lives. It is unfair to all if pick up and drop 
off for visitation are consistently tardy. Given the nature of the 
travel on the freeways and the distance the parties live apart, 
they should implement a 20-minute rule. All pick up and drop off 
must occur in the 20 minutes before or 20 minutes after the 
scheduled time. A parent and the children may assume that if a 
parent is more than 2 0 minutes late to pick up for visitation, the 
visitation is not going to occur and may move forward with other 
plans. If a parent is consistently late in drop off after 
visitation, the court may consider modification to the visitation 
schedule for the non-complying parent. 
9. Visitation is a conundrum. Petitioner asserts that after 
she makes plans for summertime visitation, for example, interfering 
activities arise, such as church camps and conferences for the 
children. 
Petitioner is entitled to the summertime parent time by 
statute and in the decree. Respondent is directed to not schedule 
other activities for the children during the times that Petitioner 
5 
schedules. If a third party, such as the children's youth group at 
church, schedules such activities, Respondent must promptly notify 
Petitioner of the scheduled activity and attempt in utmost good 
faith to find an acceptable compromise that allows the children 
both to go forward with visitation and to attend the scheduled 
third-party activities. (The Court notes that it is uncommon for 
such activities to be scheduled late in the game. Usually, since 
youth leaders need to be able to schedule with their families and 
employers also, these schedules are fixed early in the calendar 
year, if not before, and the parties should be able to accommodate 
the summer parent time wishes of the other.) If, in order to 
arrange for the children's participation in church or other third-
party activities, some give must occur, Respondent is directed to 
be the first to give to find accommodation. 
10. Respondent prevailed on all of the issues which he 
raised. Petitioner prevailed on some of the issues which she 
raised. Bearing in mind the part--fees awarded in this case, the 
Court concludes that Respondent is entitled to an award of a 
portion of his attorney's fees. Respondent's counsel is directed 
to promptly file an attorney's fee affidavit and the Court will fix 
6 
the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded to him. 
DATED this \ \ day of r j o| M 2005 
Approved as to Form: 
John Walsh 
A t t o r n e y f o r P e t i t i o n e r 
^bk. 
BY THE COURT; 
/ s / Anthony W. Schofield 
JUDGE £Af¥£x©ft~ 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
n 
NOTICE TO PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY 
TO: JOHN WALSH 
The foregoing ORDER will be submitted to the Court for 
execution and entry. Rule 7(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows five (5) days following hand delivery, or five (5) 
days plus three (3) days after mailing for opposing parties to 
submit notice of objection. If such objection is not received 
within the prescribed time period, the ORDER will be submitted for 
signing and entry by the Court. 
DATED this ^JS day of-May? 2 0 05. 
^ • • ^ — 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Respondent 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY t h a t I p e r s o n a l l y m a i l e d a t r u e and c o r r e c t 
copy of t h e f o r e g o i n g on t h i s r>5$> day of C-JLkJfiJL*> , 2 0 0 5 , 
by f i r s t - c l a s s U . S . m a i l , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d , t o t h e f o l l o w i n g : 
John Walsh 
2319 F o o t h i l l D r i v e , S u i t e 270 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84109 
Fax No. (801) 467-9713 
S e c r e t a r y ry \ 
EXHIBIT "C" 
BRIAN C. HARRISON, P . C . 
B r i a n C. H a r r i s o n (#13 88) 
A t t o r n e y f o r R e s p o n d e n t 
3651 N o r t h 100 E a s t , S u i t e 300 
P r o v o , U t a h 84604 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 3 7 5 - 7 7 0 0 
F a c s i m i l e : (801) 8 5 2 - 3 1 7 5 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SHERYL DEVERAUX, ] 
Petitioner, 
-vs- ] 
TODD DEVERAUX, ] 
Respondent. ] 
1 SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
) Civil No. 964401781 
) JUDGE SCHOFIELD 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on April 13, 
2 005, and the Court having issued its Order, and the Court having 
considered Petitioner's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment and 
having issued its Order thereon, and the Court having directed 
Respondent to file an Attorney's Fee Affidavit in order for the 
Court to determine the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded, and 
said Attorney's Fee Affidavit having been filed, and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent is awarded his attorney's 
fees incurred herein in the sum of $ )5>00 < said sum being 
hereby reduced to judgment. 
DATED this Qjp day of /y&feVVlWO^ 2005. 
BY THE COURT: 
IB/ ANTHONY W. QCHORELD 
JUDGE SCHOFIELD 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the Attorney's Fee Affidavit and the Supplemental Order on 
this 9th day of September, 2005, by first-class U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Sheryl Devereaux 
1387 E. Hollowdale Drive 
Cottonwood Heights, Utah 84121 
^3ji^\AlJLA. 1 
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